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The implied human rights obligations of UNHCR
Abstract
Amongst the discourse surrounding the potential for non-State actors to hold human rights obligations
are complex questions around what those rights entail, where they derive from and in what circumstances
they apply. In an attempt to add clarity to that discussion, this article identifies the implied powers of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) as a potential catalyst for the creation of its
human rights obligations. As a subsidiary body of the UN, UNHCR is imbued with the capacity to hold
human rights obligations through attribution and derivative international legal personality, as well as via
its status as an organisation to which the 'general rules of international law' apply. UNHCR has implied
powers to administer refugee camps and conduct Refugee Status Determination (RSD). It is argued that
when the 'quasi-sovereign' character of camp administration is considered in light of the particular
vulnerability of refugees' human rights, their protection cannot be separated from camp administration or
from the camp administrator itself, meaning that UNHCR has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil
the human rights of the inhabitants of the camps it administers. It is also argued that the unambiguous
obligation for all parties that undertake RSD to respect non-refoulement, which is a human rights principle
that is considered the 'cornerstone' of international protection, creates a concurrent obligation to ensure
that RSD procedures are 'fair, efficient and effective'. Although the identification of rights obligations of
non-State actors inevitably faces challenges from the lack of available remedies for individuals who seek
liability for human rights breaches, as long as UNHCR undertakes activities that places it in direct contact
with individuals, it is imperative that it retains limited human rights obligations that exist alongside of, and
not in substitution for, those of States.
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THE IMPLIED HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF UNHCR
NIAMH KINCHIN*
In an era of expanding global governance and diminishing importance of State
sovereignty the ‘human rights conversation’ can no longer be confined to States’
capacity, obligations, and appetite for rights protection. It is hardly controversial to
suggest that when non-State actors possess the capacity to affect human rights, the
extent to which that actor should be accountable for their protection must be at the
forefront of that conversation. Identifying what human rights obligations are
applicable, from where those obligations derive and in what circumstances they are
relevant however, is more contentious.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) is an agency that, as
discussed in Part I, is capable of holding human rights obligations via its position as a
subsidiary organ of the UN through attribution and derivative international legal
personality. In addition, the ‘general rules of international law’ outlined in article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) apply to UNHCR to create a
legal obligation to respect customary international law, which include human rights.
However, which human rights UNHCR is obligated to protect, in what circumstances
and the consequences of those obligations is not defined by the sources of its capacity
for human rights obligations.
In Part II, it is argued that UNHCR’s implied powers,1 which are those powers which,
though not expressly provided in its constituent instrument, ‘are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties’ 2 create
obligations for it to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees in limited
circumstances. The administration of refugee camps and the performance of refugee
status determination (RSD), both of which are implied powers of UNHCR, contain
1

Implied powers are: ‘[R]ead into the organization’s statute not in order to modify it or add to the
members’ burdens, but in order to give effect to what they agreed by becoming parties to the
constitutional treaty.’ K Skubiszewski, ‘Implied Powers of International Organizations’ in Y Dinstein
(ed) International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Nijhoff
Dordrecht 1989) 856.
2
Reparations for the Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (‘Reparations’) [1949] ICJ
Rep 174, 182 (emphasis added).
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obligations to protect human rights. When the ‘quasi sovereign’ character of camp
administration is considered in light of the particular vulnerability of refugees, it is
clear that the protection of their human rights cannot be separated from camp
administration or the camp administrator, which is often UNHCR. Further, there is an
obligation

for

all

parties who undertake RSD, including UNHCR, to respect non-refoulement, which is
the obligation to not expel or return a person to a country where their life or freedom
would be threatened by persecution or torture and is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of
international protection. As a consequence, a concurrent obligation is created to
ensure that RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective.
Finally, in the Conclusion the lack of remedies for human rights violations is
considered and potential ways forward suggested.

I.

DOES UNHCR HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HOLD HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS?

Sometimes the constitutions of International Organizations (IOs) or their subsidiary
bodies expressly place a non-State actor within the framework of human rights. For
example, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that established the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) declares that the High Commissioner
shall:
Function within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, other international instruments of human rights and
international law…3

‘Functioning within the framework’ of human rights instruments may be interpreted
as an obligation to administer that framework or more expansively, to protect human
rights because UNHCHR cannot function within a framework it is not bound by.
Regardless, it is more common for constitutions of non-State actors to not expressly
* Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong. I wish
to acknowledge the helpful comments made by the anonymous reviewers.
3
UNGA Res 141 (1993) GAOR 48th sess, 85th plen mtg Doc/A/Res/48/141 [3(a)].
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create obligations relating to human rights. As a consequence, whether, and to what
extent, non-State actors retain human rights obligations is yet to find international
consensus,4 partly because obligations for human rights will differ for each actor. The
extent of the human rights obligations of UNHCR, which is not formally bound by
human rights instruments, is dependent on an enquiry that raises two questions. First,
what are the sources of UNHCR’s capacity to hold human rights obligations? Second,
if UNHCR is accountable for human rights protection, what is the nature of those
rights and to whom are they due?

1.1

Source of UNHCR’s Human Rights Obligations I: Position as a

Subsidiary Organ of the UN

UNHCR’s position as a UN subsidiary organ, which is confirmed by article 1 of its
Statute, 5 means that whilst UNHCR acts in a manner that can be described as
somewhat independent, it cannot be separated from the UN as an organization. In
particular, UNHCR facilitates the functions of the UNGA by adopting and carrying
out its decisions. Further, UNHCR's tasks and functions are dependent on the scope of
UNGA’s powers, 6 meaning that it cannot be delegated more powers than UNGA
possesses.7 As a consequence, UNHCR’s acts are not only attributable to the UN; it
derives its international legal personality from it. Both attribution and international
legal personality create obligations for UNHCR to protect the human rights of
refugees in certain circumstances.

4

Andrew Clapham describes the ‘old objections’ to imposing human rights obligations on non-state
actors in A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 33–56. See also G
Giacca, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014) 232-72 on the
indeterminacy of the human rights obligations of armed non-state actors.
5
UNGA Res 428(V) (1950) GAOR, 5th sess, 325th plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v). UNHCR assumes the
function of international protection ‘under the auspices of the United Nations’ and that it acts ‘under
the authority of the General Assembly’. Accordingly, UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the UN because
it functions under its ‘auspices’ and acts under the authority of the UNGA, which itself is an organ of
the UN.
6
C Felix Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd ed CUP
2003) 140–41.
7
H G Schermers, Blokker, N. M, International Institutional Law (5th ed, Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 17273. The authors also point out that an IO cannot transfer its responsibility to a subsidiary organ.
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1.1.1 The Human Rights Obligations of the UN
If UNHCR’s capacity to hold human rights obligations stem from its position as a UN
subsidiary organ, then it follows that the UN must also have the capacity to hold
human rights obligations. This proposition rests on four foundations. First, the UN is
a subject of international law because it has international legal personality8 that is
dependent upon its ‘purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent
documents and developed in practice.’ 9 In the WHO Case the ICJ stated that
‘international organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law,
under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
parties’.10 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not define what comprises ‘general rules
of international law’ and whilst its human rights component continues to attract
debate, 11 it is largely accepted that it incorporates both jus cogens, which are
peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted,12 and laws that derive from
custom.13 Accordingly, the UN will be bound by human rights obligations that are
either customary international law or jus cogens.
This argument encounters difficulty from the fact that the State is a fundamental
component of customary international law, which makes any assertion that obligations
are ‘incumbent’ upon the UN problematic. However, two factors point to an
obligation for the UN to respect customary international law. First, the UN, as an
organization, is considered a subject of international law whose 'duties depend upon
its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and
developed in practice'.14 Logically there is no impediment to the extension of its rights

8

See G Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (CUP 2011) 58-72 for the
importance of legal personality to the human rights obligations of the UN.
9
Reparations [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 180.
10
Interpretation of the Agreement of March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (‘WHO Case’) [1980]
ICJ Rep 73, 89 – 90. Clapham (n 2) 9 states that ‘it is plain that international organizations have human
rights obligations’ by citing The WHO Case.
11
A N Pronto, ‘‘Human-Rightism’ and the Development of General International Law’ (2007) 20 LJIL
753.
12
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January
1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 53.
13
See M T Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on General
International Law’ in M T Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds) Final Report on the Impact of
International Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009).
14
Reparations (n 7) 180.
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and duties to customary international law where they relate to its functions and
purposes as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in
practice. Second, although the UN does not officially contribute to the formation of
customary international law15 its actions can be viewed as evidence of opinio juris
and State practice. UNGA resolutions and other non-binding statements from IOs may
be evidence of opinio juris where they receive endorsement from States. 16 Opinio
juris is the first element of customary international law and according to the ‘human
rights method’ of identification, the primary element.17 In addition, treaties, rules and
the decisions of the judicial organs of IOs are generally considered to be capable of
contributing to State practice.18 Contribution to customary international law may not
necessarily bind an organization, but it gives weight to the proposition that IOs are
bound by customary international law as principles of general international law. As
Verdirame argues, it would be ‘extremely disruptive for the international system to
tolerate the presence of actors that are endowed with legal personality, and thus with
the legal capacity to operate upon the international plane, but are exempt form a body
of universally or almost universally accepted rules.’19
The second foundation for the UN’s capacity to hold human rights obligations are
circumstances where it is involved in peacekeeping duties and/or the temporary
administration of a territory,20 which are operations that are undertaken as part of the
UN Security Council’s (UNSC) responsibilities for international peace and security.21
15

M Janmyr Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps (Martinus Nijhoff 2014) 236; Giacca (n 2) 237.
The ICJ has stated that ‘opinio juris may… be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and
the attitude of States towards certain UNGA resolutions (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (‘Nicaragua Case’)[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 188) and that resolutions ‘can, in certain
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of… the emergence of an
opinio juris’ (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep
226, 70.
17
J Wouters and C Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’
in M T Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds) Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights
Law on General International Law (OUP 2009) 111-31.
18
J Klabbers and A Wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations
(Edward Elgar 2011) 207.
19
Verdirame (n 6) 71.
20
The International Law Association (ILA) recommends that the human rights and humanitarian law
applicable to the activities of IOs include basic human rights obligations in the temporary
administration of territory and peace keeping and enforcement activities. International Law Association
Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version of Recommended Rules and Practices
(RRP’s) New Dehli Conference 2002, 12.
21
See United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping’
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml for discussion on the legal mandate
of the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations.
16

5

It has been argued that when the UN temporarily administers a territory, such as in
East Timor from 1999–2002 and in Kosovo from 1999 (albeit in a limited capacity
since 2008), it acts as a ‘quasi-sovereign’ because it has complete responsibility for
the administration of that territory, including civil and security matters. 22 The
breakdown of a State’s governance and national security leaves a human rights
‘vacuum’ so that the more the UN emulates a State, the more fully human rights
obligations apply to it.23 Augmenting this argument is the assertion that the UN has
the same human rights obligations as the State in which it operates, regardless of
whether they arise from customary international law or treaties.24 When the UN takes
on quasi-sovereign status, the human rights obligations of the administered State
remain in force throughout the administration and ‘may be said to be binding by
reasoning of established principles of the law of state succession.’ 25 For example,
although the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
had effective control/administration of Kosovo since 1999, it is arguable that the
human rights obligations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained in force
whilst that State still existed because, as the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has
stated, ‘once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant,
such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them,
notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment
in more than one State or State succession.’26 Similarly, the UN has agreed to ‘respect
all local laws and regulations’ as part of its peace-keeping operations,27 meaning that
it is arguable that where the local State is a signatory to, and therefore bound by a
human rights instrument, UN peace keeping personnel are similarly bound.28

22

F Megret and F Hoffman, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator?: Some Reflections on the United
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 HumRtsQ 316. A Slaughter and J Crisp,
‘A Surrogate State? The role of UNHCR in Protected Refugee Situations’ (Research paper No. 168,
UNHCR, January 2009) 8.
23
Ibid 314, 323.
24
I Bantekas and L Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2013) 678.
25
P M Dupont, ‘Detention of Individuals During Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned from
Kosovo’ in R Arnold & G A Knoops (eds), Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations
Under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 249, 256.
26
UN Human Rights Comm, General Comment No. 26: Continuity of obligations 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/Cl2l1Rev.1/Add.81Rev.1 (8 Dec 1997).
27
The Secretary General, Draft Model Status of Forces Agreement/or Peace-keeping Operations, 37,
UN Doc. A/45/594 (9 Oct 1990) [art 6].
28
T Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective
Accountability: How Liability Should be Appropriated for Violations of Human Rights by Member
State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers’ (2010) 51 HarvIntlLJ 113, 138.
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The third human rights foundation is the obligations that arise from the UN Charter.
In the Administrative Tribunal Case 29 the ICJ found that the UN had an implied
power to establish an administrative tribunal under article 7(2) of its Charter. The
Court claimed that power to establish the tribunal was essential to ‘give effect to the
paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence
and integrity’ and that ‘capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment out of the
Charter’. 30 By linking the need for a tribunal to the Charter, the Court created an
obligation for the UN to create the tribunal, not just an authority to do so. The
preamble of the UN Charter states that one of its purposes is to ‘reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights’. Article 1(3) of the Charter states that the purpose of the
UN is to ‘promote and encourage respect for human rights’ and article 55(c) states
that the UN shall promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.’ If the creation of an administrative tribunal can be conceptualized as an
obligation that is based upon the purpose of the Charter, it could be argued that an
obligation to protect human rights arises as a necessary intendment out of the Charter
because a failure to protect human rights is incongruous with an objective to promote
them.31 It is acknowledged that whilst the UN has authority to take action to create a
tribunal as a subsidiary organ under article 7(2), no similar authority exists to take
direct action regarding human rights protection. However, it is difficult to conceive
how a body that is tasked to promote human rights, and declares that its own
personnel is to act in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),32 has no need to protect those human rights itself.33
The fourth foundation of the UN’s human rights obligations is a simple one. The UN
is an international organization that is made up of member states, which means that it
29

Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory
Opinion) (‘Administrative Tribunal Case’) [1954] ICJ Rep, 47.
30
Administrative Tribunal Case ibid, 47, 57. Cf ‘The WHO Case’ (n 8) where the court expressed
concern that finding that agencies of the UN had wide implied powers would break down the division
of powers between UN and its agencies, undermining the court’s concept of the UN as a system.
31
Megret and Hoffman (n 20) 317 suggest that the UN ‘is bound by international human rights
standards as a result of being tasked to promote them by its own internal and constitutional legal order,
without any added judicial finesse’.
32
Clapham (n 2) 127 points out that the UN’s Code of Conduct for Peacekeepers and the Handbook for
Military Observers and Civilian Police state that personnel are to act in accordance with the UDHR.
33
See J Paust, ‘The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights,
Remedies, and Nonimmunity (2010) 51 HarvIntlLJ 301.
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is bound ‘transitively’ by human rights as a result and to the extent that its members
are bound.34 States do not relinquish their human rights obligations when an IO takes
action on their behalf.35 In M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany the European
Commission of Human Rights found that the transfer of State powers to an IO is valid
only when the protection of fundamental human rights by that IO is equivalent to the
standards that States would ordinarily be bound under the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).36 This ‘doctrine of equivalent protection’ may, in time, have
relevance for the UN.

1.1.2

The Subsidiary Human Rights Obligations of UNHCR

UNHCR’s human rights obligations do not exist separately from the UN. 37 This
proposition finds support in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), which has declared that internationally wrongful acts that are committed by
one of the UN’s subsidiary organs are attributable to the UN.38 As discussed above,
when the UN or one of its subsidiary organs temporarily administers a territory it does
so as a de jure administrator, which means it is given a formal mandate in the form of
a UNSC resolution and/or as part of a treaty, to administer the territory. 39 In Behrami
the ECtHR found that the actions40 of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and UNMIK
were attributable to NATO and the UN as their subsidiary organs because the UN and
NATO had ‘effective control’ of the territory. 41 The significance of the Behrami
decision for the human rights obligations of UNHCR is not in relation to issues of
territorial administration however, it is in the court’s finding that ‘UNMIK was a

34

Megret and Hoffman (n 20) 318. See also Bantekas and Oette (n 21).
The International Law Commissions (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, art 5.
36
M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany App No 13258/87 (Commission Decision, 9 Feb 1990). See
also Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR 30 June 2005) 155.
European Convention on Human Rights formally known as Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 213 UNTS 222.
37
The nature of UNHCR’s human rights obligations are not identical to that of the UN. Instead,
UNHCR’s human rights obligations are dictated by its objectives and functions.
38
Behrami and Behrami v France and Seramati v France, Germany and Norway App No 71412/01
and App No, 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007) (‘Behrami’).
39
Verdirame (n 6) 230.
40
A failure to detonate mines and false imprisonment.
41
Behrami (n 34) 128-143. Effective control’ is the exercise of public functions (legislative, executive
or judicial) in a way that amounts to territorial control. ibid 233-35.
35
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subsidiary organ of the UN institutionally directly and fully answerable to the UNSC’
and ‘that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII of the
Charter so that the impugned inaction was, in principle, “attributable” to the UN in
the same sense.’ 42 In other words, if the conduct of a subsidiary organ, such as
UNHCR, can be attributable to the UN, and the UN is bound by an international
obligation, then that body is capable of violating that international obligation qua its
position as a subsidiary organ. The UN Legal Counsel has supported this
interpretation of the court’s finding by stating:
As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, in
principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an
international obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and
its liability in compensation.43

Whilst the Behrami decision relied upon the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations (DARIO)

44

(since updated to the Articles on the

Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO)) to inform its usage of the term
‘attribution’, ARIO does not assist in defining what constitutes an international
obligation. ARIO does not create international obligations; it refers to obligations that
are attributable to the IO, which are created by other instruments and rules of
international law.45 Whilst ‘when and which’ human rights obligations bind the UN as
international obligations remains open, where UN’s international obligations can be
identified as having a human rights character, UNHCR inherits those same obligations
through attribution.
The second way that UNHCR ‘inherits’ human rights obligations via its status as a
UN subsidiary organ is through international legal personality. UNHCR derives
international legal personality, which is compatible with its objectives and functions,

42

ibid 142-43.
Unpublished letter of 3 February 2004 by the UN Legal Counsel to the Director of the Codification
Division, quoted in ILC Report (2004) UN Doc A/59/10, 112. Verdirame (n 6) 199-200.
44
The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), Official Records
of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 UN Doc A/66/10 (3 June 2011),
create responsibility for an IO committing a ‘wrongful act’, which is defined as an act or omission that
is attributable to an IO under international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation
for that organizations (art 4).
45
See Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) Sixtysixth sess, agenda
item 81A/RES/66/100, art 4.
43
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from the UN.46 Although the ICJ was referring to the UN when it declared that ‘the
rights and duties of … the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions
as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice’,47 the
court established that non-State actors may possess some international legal
personality but only to the extent of the ‘function they are to fulfil in that legal
order’, 48 or to the extent that States as the subjects of international law confer on
them. The purpose and functions that can be implied from constituent documents and
subsequent practice will depend on the particular organization, but they must be
conferred by reasonable implication ‘as capacities required to enable the
organizationss to discharge their functions effectively.’49 The ICJ has confirmed this
approach in subsequent cases.50
Although it has been argued that UNHCR has international legal personality simply
by virtue of being an IO,51 even a more narrow approach (i.e. that UNHCR has only
that degree of international legal personality that is conferred on it by the UN 52 )
establishes its capacity to hold human rights obligations. As human rights obligations
are a component of the UN’s international legal personality, those obligations will
flow from the UN to UNHCR, albeit in a way that is dictated by the objectives and
functions of UNHCR, which, as discussed in Part II, relate to the protection of
refugees.

1.2

Source of UNHCR’s Human Rights Obligations II: General Rules of

International Law

46

Verdirame (n 6) 62.
Reparations (n 7) 180.
48
ibid.
49
Amerasinghe (n 4) 102.
50
See eg., Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Article 2, of the Charter) (Advisory
Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 167; Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Mazilu Case) (Advisory Opinion) [1989] ICJ Rep
177, 195–97.
51
Janmyr (n 13) 229-30.
52
G Gilbert, ‘Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: UNHCR and the New
World Order’ (1998) 10 IJRL 350, 358. An alternative view is that there is no implication that
UNHCR’s legal personality must necessarily be narrower than that of the UN. F Green,
‘Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ’s Flawed Approach to Non-State Actors and International
Legal Personality’ (2008) Melbourne Journal of International Law 47, 72.
47
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If ‘international organizations are … bound by any obligations incumbent upon them
under general rules of international law…’53 UNHCR will be bound by virtue of
being an IO, rather than through its status as a subsidiary organ of the UN.
The definition of an IO is evolving beyond its traditional understanding as an
organization formed by a multi-lateral treaty. 54 The International Law Commission
(ILC) has described IOs as bodies that are established by treaty or other instruments
that are governed by international law, and which possess their own legal
personality. 55 This definition includes organizationss that have been created by
‘instruments, such as resolutions adopted by the UNGA or by a conference of
States.’ 56 Amerasinghe defines an IO as a body that possesses five identifying
characteristics; that it should be established by some kind of international agreement
by States, that it possess a constitution, that it will possess organs that are separate
from its members, that it is established under international law and finally, that it will
57

have an exclusive or predominant membership of State or governments.

Amerasinghe further argues that international personality, along with treaty-making
capacity, are not intrinsic to the definition of an IO.58
Although not created by treaty,59 UNHCR was established according to international
law by a UNGA resolution. UNHCR’s constitution is its mandate, which includes
both its Statute and UNGA resolutions. Although UNHCR does not have members
that are separate from the UN's members, those members are exclusively States.
Regardless of whether legal personality is required by an IO, UNHCR derives legal
personality from the UN that is compatible with its objectives and functions. 60 As
discussed above, general international law contains customary international law and
the rules of customary international law that create human rights obligations for
UNHCR are the subject of Part II.
53

The WHO Case (n 8) 89–90 (emphasis added).
J Klabbers, ‘Unity, Diversity, Accountability: ‘The Ambivalent Concept of International
Organisation’ (2013)14 Melb JInt'lL 149-170.
55
ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-fifth Session’ (5 May–6 July and 7 July–8
August 2003) GAOR 58th Session Supp 10, 38.
56
ibid 38-39.
57
Amerasinghe (n 4) 10.
58
ibid 10–11.
59
N D White states that IOs are usually, but not exclusively, created by a multilateral treaty. Nigel D
White, The Law of International Organizations (2nd ed, MUP 2005) 1.
60
According to Klabbers, the identification of an IO by reference to traditional formal criteria is
unhelpful because law is largely unable to make such distinctions. Klabbers (n 50) 152.
54
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II

UNHCR’S IMPLIED POWERS AS A SOURCE OF ITS HUAMN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

As an IO understood in the broad sense outlined above, UNHCR has the capacity for
implied powers.61 As an organization with the capacity for human rights obligations,
it is argued that two of these powers, the administration of refugee camps and RSD,
carry obligations to adhere to certain human rights standards.

2.1

The Administration of Refugee Camps and RSD as Implied Powers of

UNHCR

Implied powers of an institution are additional (but not ‘new’62) powers to those that
are expressed in a body’s constituent instrument. In Reparations, the ICJ defined
implied powers in the following way:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.63

Keeping to one side controversies around the breadth of this definition and whether it
should be confined to those powers that are necessarily implied by the powers
expressly granted in an IO's constitution,64 if UNHCR has powers that are necessarily
implied as being essential to the performance of its duties, then it is essential that it
have the ability to define and adopt measures to ‘achieve the object and purpose of
supervising the international framework governing refugee protection’.65 Considering
that ‘sovereign States have the primary responsibility for respecting and ensuring the
61
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fundamental rights of everyone within their territory and subject to their
jurisdiction’,66 the powers of UNHCR that can be necessarily implied are those that
are essential to either the facilitation by UNHCR of protection by States, or the direct
protection of refugees where States will not or cannot, provide protection. Examples
of the latter, which are the focus of this article, are the powers to administer refugee
camps and carry out RSD.
UNHCR’s Statute enables UNHCR to undertake ‘additional activities’, which are to
be determined by the UNGA.67 Accordingly, UNHCR’s statute expressly allows for
implied powers, the only stipulation being that their nature is to be ‘determined’ by
the UNGA. In practice it has primarily been UNHCR that has identified the additional
activities that it needs to fulfil its mandate responsibility for international protection.
UNHCR's 1994 Note on International Protection (‘Protection Note’) states that these
functions include ‘securing admission, asylum, and respect for basic human rights,
including the principle of non-refoulement’, durable solutions and the promotion of
legislation to ‘ensure that refugees are identified and accorded an appropriate status
and standard of treatment in their countries of asylum’, amongst other things. 68
UNHCR’s 2000 Protection Note separates its international protection functions into
four ‘principal protection challenges’, which are (a) ensuring the availability and
quality of asylum; (b) revitalizing the refugee protection system; (c) promoting
durable solutions from a protection perspective and engaging in in-country protection
activities; and (d) fostering partnerships in support of the international refugee
protection system. The note outlines operational activities to strengthen asylum,
which includes ‘receiving asylum-seekers and refugees’, ‘intervening with
authorities’, ‘ensuring physical safety’, ‘protecting women, children and the elderly’,
‘promoting national legislation and asylum procedures’, ‘participating in national
refugee status determination procedures’, ‘undertaking determination of refugee
status’ (ie. RSD), ‘providing advice and developing jurisprudence’ and ‘staff
development’. 69 More recently, UNHCR defined some its ‘standard functions’ as
66

UNHCR, ‘Note on International Protection’ UN Doc A/AC.96/830 (7 September 1994) [13]. A
State’s human rights obligations within jurisdiction arise via the obligation to perform human rights
treaties in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) Vienna Convention (n 10) art 26.
67
UNHCR Statute (n 3) art 9.
68
1994 Note (n 62) [12].
69
‘Report on the eighteenth meeting of the Standing Committee’ UN Doc A/AC.96/930 (7 July 2000)
[10-30].

13

including ‘relief distribution, emergency preparedness, special humanitarian activities,
broader development work, as well as registration, determination of status and issuance of
documentation for persons falling under the mandate.’70

Although, unlike RSD, the administration of refugee camps is not identified as a
separate protection activity, activities associated with camp administration are
referred to in relation to other operational activities. For example, the 2000 Protection
Note refers to the importance of ensuring physical safety of refugees within camps71
and taking measures to protect women, children and the elderly within camps, giving
the example of establishing women’s centres in a number of camps. 72 Further, the
UNGA endorses UNHCR’s interpretation of its operational duties when it expressly
refers to those activities as belonging to UNHCR.73
The administration of refugee camps and RSD are implied powers of UNHCR
because they are activities that are essential to its international protection function
when States cannot or will not comply with their protection obligations under
international refugee law. Where a State refuses to take on formal protection
responsibilities, or cannot do so due to poverty or internal conflict, there is a gap
between the rights conferred by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(‘Refugee Convention’) 74 and the duty to protect those rights, which causes a
‘protection vacuum’. 75 In certain situations UNHCR must possess the ability to
provide that protection itself, the authority to do so being necessarily implied from its
international protection function.
Two issues regarding this argument are acknowledged. First, UNHCR’s power to
undertake these activities is contingent on permission being granted by States to
operate within their territory. Accordingly, whilst UNHCR may have an implied
70
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power to undertake these activities, it may not be able to do so if it has not been
issued an invitation to operate within the State’s territory. Second, an implied power
to undertake protection activities is a power and not an obligation. Whilst Verdirame
argues that obligations can equally be implied into a constituent instrument
(advocating for the alternative ‘implied terms’)76 it is important that UNHCR’s ability
to undertake protection activities is perceived as a power to ensure that it is not
burdened with new protection obligations that it was never intended to have. This,
however, does not mean that UNHCR's implied powers cannot contain obligations to
exercise the power in accordance with broadly-accepted aspirations, such as human
rights protection. Once UNHCR has committed to undertaking these activities, they
become part of its relationship with refugees and are the catalyst for the identification
of its human rights obligations.

2.2

Protecting Human Rights in Refugee Camps

An obligation for UNHCR to adhere to human rights standards is inherent to its
administration of refugee camps.
Although protection of refugees remains the responsibility of States, in some
circumstances such as where there has been a mass influx of refugees and a
subsequent protracted refugee situation, States have often taken on a limited role in
camp administration. The reasons for this are varied but include a reluctance to
expend national resources on a growing number of displaced people, the changing
nature of conflict from external to internal aggression, a growing sense by developing
countries that they are being burdened by a disproportionate number of refugees77 and
a general shift in an international mindset, which dates from the 1980s, from
accommodation of refugees to control of their intake.78 More often, it is a matter of
lack of resources. The large Dadaab camps in Kenya (Dagahaley, Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo 2
and Kambioos), which were established following the breakdown of governance in
76
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Somalia in 1991, are an example of camps where the State, Kenya, was both unable
and unwilling to undertake complete administration of the camps and according to
Wilde, only allowed them to be established if UNHCR accepted full practical
responsibility.79
In conjunction with its NGO implementing partners,80 UNHCR is responsible for the
de facto administration of refugee camps. De facto administration means that the
administrating authority does not have a formal mandate in the form of a UNSC
resolution and/or as part of a treaty to administer the territory.81 This does not mean,
however, that UNHCR is operating within the territory of a State without its
permission. Camp administration is formalised by an agreement between UNHCR
and the host State,82 which outlines the broad expectations of both parties, including
the role of UNHCR in assisting governments in the protection of refugees and the
State in providing the facilities and resources for UNHCR to carry out its work, as
well as to ensure immunities and protection for UNHCR staff.83
Refugees’ human rights are common with and additional to those held by the general
population.84 As the primary instrument for international protection, article 7 of the
Refugee Convention provides that, except where the Refugee Convention contains
more favourable provisions, all refugees should be accorded the same treatment that
normally applies to ‘aliens’. Although States have traditionally been considered to
bestow human rights on individuals through the ratification of a treaty, a State’s
79
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commitment to pacta sunt servanda85 is enough to allow individuals to benefit from
those rights assigned to them,86 meaning that refugees, ‘along with aliens, are entitled
to claim the protection and benefit of any human rights treaties that the State, on
whose territory they are, has adopted; in addition to any protections guaranteed under
customary international law.’87
Some rights protected by human rights treaties are particular to refugees, including
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 88 The
Refugee Convention confers a number of rights on refugees, which include the right
not to be refouled,89 the right not to be discriminated against in the application of the
Refugee Convention, 90 the right to be treated no less favourably than other aliens
regarding housing,91 property rights,92 freedom of internal movement,93expedition of
naturalization94 and religious freedom.95 Although the Refugee Convention is not as
comprehensive in regard to civil and socio-economic rights as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 96 James Hathaway argues the
inability of States to make reservations to such rights as discrimination, religious
freedom and refoulement ‘entrenches a universal minimum guarantee of basic
liberties for refugees’.97 Where refugees reside in States that are not signatories to the
Refugee Convention the protection of refugees’ rights is provided by international
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protection by UNHCR and the binding character of non-refoulement as a customary
rule of international law.98
Although human rights instruments and customary international law are applicable to
refugees within and outside of refugee camps,99 the refugee camp model has received
criticism for enabling the violation of human rights. Verdirame argues that refugee
camps are inherently incompatible with international human rights law and are
therefore ultra vires 100 because their existence infringes the right to ‘freedom of
movement’, which is protected by article 26 of the Refugee Convention and article 12
of the ICCPR. Marjoleine Ziek points to the protracted nature of refugee situations,
and the related phenomenon of ‘warehousing’ of refugees as creating a situation
where ‘many refugees spend one, two, three or more decades in camps without such
basic human rights as freedom of movement, protection from violence, and the right
to support their families.’101 Verdirame draws upon field research from the Dadaab
camps to present examples of breaches of other human rights such as freedom of
expression and the right to a fair trial,102 forced labour103 and the right to an adequate
standard of living, which is a violation of article 11 of the ICESR.104 If UNHCR has a
capacity to hold human rights obligations and an implied power to administer refugee
camps, is UNHCR accountable for the protection of the human rights of the
inhabitants of those camps?
Ralph Wilde argues that UNHCR’s human rights obligations within refugee camps are
based upon the agreement between UNHCR and the host country to conduct
humanitarian and asylum-related activities within the latter’s jurisdiction. Wilde
claims that a Model Agreement has the effect of the host country transferring its
obligations to protect human rights by delegating its international legal personality to
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UNHCR to the extent that it is relevant to UNHCR’s purposes and functions. 105
According to Wilde, ‘the degree to which international law can apply to UNHCR's
governance is inextricably linked to international law's influence on the sovereign
entity.’106 If the State were to conduct the kind of activities that UNHCR undertakes
within its jurisdiction, such as administering refugee camps, it would be bound by its
human rights obligations in respect of those activities. As UNHCR is undertaking
these activities on its behalf, the State confers UNHCR with the relevant international
legal personality - being its own human rights obligations.
There are two difficulties with Wilde’s argument. First, it relies on the proposition that
the State confers its international legal personality to UNHCR through a Model
Agreement. Whilst Reparations found that member States clothed the UN with the
competence required to enable the functions entrusted to it to be effectively
discharged, 107 that ‘clothing of competence’ was a result of a binding treaty in
international law (i.e. the UN Charter). It is difficult to see how a Model Agreement
might have the same effect. UNHCR has not been entrusted with functions by the host
State but has merely been given permission to exercise its functions within its
jurisdiction. In addition, there is no clear ICJ authority on the direct transferal of
international legal personality from States to the subsidiary organs of the UN.
Although this does not mean that such an argument cannot succeed, without that
authority it is a more convincing proposition to argue, as earlier in this article, that
UNHCR is conferred its international legal personality from the UN as its parent
organization.
Second, a State cannot contract out its obligations. Only a State can be held liable for
the violation of human rights instruments. Although article 2(1) of the ICCPR states
that State parties to the Convention undertake to ‘respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant …’ the Human Rights Commission, confirming Article 5 of the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ,108 has
105
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stated that the article does not imply that a State cannot be held accountable where
one of its ‘agents’ commits a violation of its obligations under human rights
instruments inside the territory of another State.109 A State cannot avoid liability for
human rights obligations because an agent (ie. an IO) is ‘sub-contracted’ to act for it
in an extraterritorial capacity. Indeed, the State could be held responsible if the IO
were not to act in compliance with its functions and implied human rights
obligations.110
It is well supported by the ICJ that when a State exerts ‘effective control’ over another
territory, human rights obligations apply. In Namibia, the ICJ held that ‘[t]he fact that
South Africa no longer has any title to administer the territory does not release it from
its obligations and responsibilities under international law …’111 Further, it is arguable
that the human rights obligations of an administered State remain in force whilst that
State exists because, as the HRC has stated, ‘once the people are accorded the
protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory
and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State
party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession.’ 112
Although these issues relate to de jure rather than de facto administration, if both an
administering and administered State can retain human rights obligations in certain
circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how a State that is subject to a limited de
facto administration in the form of refugee camp administration can be said to transfer
its human rights obligations to that authority via its international legal personality.
UNHCR's accountability for human rights protections in the context of refugee camps
should not rely on the host State’s human rights obligations except to the point they
are diminished, practically if not theoretically. In such circumstances, UNHCR’s
human rights obligations act to fill in the protection vacuum created. Refugee
populations are the responsibility of their host nation, but where refugee camps exist
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that
capacity in the particular instance.
109
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it is UNHCR, which, with the assistance of partner organizationss and States,
commonly assumes their administration. When a refugee camp is primarily
administered by an organization other than the host State, the nature of the activities
undertaken puts that organization into the position of ‘micro-sovereignty’ 113 or a
‘surrogate state’.114 Whilst some activities may be provided by the host State, such as
security/law and order services provided by the Kenyan government for example, and
whilst UNHCR may rely on those States to provide those services, 115 they do not
detract from the fact that UNHCR is the primary administrator.
The camp administration activities undertaken by UNHCR in conjunction with its
NGO implementing partners resemble those provided by States. As camp
administrator, UNHCR undertakes functions that include registering refugees and
providing them with personal documentation, ‘ensuring that they have access to
shelter, food, water, health care and education’, and ‘establishing policing and justice
mechanisms’, 116 including the provision of security personnel and services. 117 In
addition, UNHCR is responsible for long-term ‘care and maintenance’ programmes
within camps. ‘Care and maintenance’ is defined as ‘assistance to refugees in a
relatively stable situation, where survival is no longer threatened, but where future of
the refugee group has not yet been determined in terms of durable solutions.’ 118
Slaughter and Crisp describe the care and maintenance model as creating:
a widespread perception that the organization [UNHCR] was a surrogate state,
complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services
(education, health care, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community
participation, gender equality).119
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It is argued that as an organization with direct engagement with individuals and
groups who are protected by human rights,120 UNHCR must respect, protect and fulfil
the human rights of the inhabitants of the camps it administers.121 UNHCR identifies
the importance of a ‘rights based approach’ in operational camps and settlements122
and acknowledges that it ‘has a global mandate to ensure that the human rights of its
beneficiaries are upheld in accordance with the international obligations of States
hosting them.’ 123 Although an IO’s obligations to ‘protect and fulfil’ human rights
may be contested,124 it is argued that the particular vulnerability of refugees in camps,
the role of UNHCR in the provision of fundamental goods, services and overall
governance, and the diminished role of host States, means that UNHCR has a duty to
protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees within the camps that it administers to
the ‘extent that their functions allow them to fulfil such a duty’.125 This duty arises
from its own human rights obligations and not those of States. UNHCR’s role in
overseeing the provision of humanitarian aid and taking on the responsibility of ‘care
and maintenance’ in lieu of the host State means it is not only accountable for the
respect and protection of human rights, it must fulfil them by providing services and
developing strategies to build capacities that ensure their human rights are met.126
UNHCR’s implied power to administer refugee camps cannot be separated from an
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the individuals and groups
residing within refugee camps. Whilst this obligation may not rely upon binding
international instrumentality, it forms part of UNHCR’s wider role of international
protection.
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2.3

Non-refoulement, RSD and Procedural Standards

Responsibility for RSD lies with States. 127 However, where States abdicate their
protection duties, which primarily occurs when a State lacks the resources and
capacity to carry out RSD, or where a host State is not a signatory to the Refugee
Convention but hosts a large number of refugees, UNHCR has little choice but to
conduct RSD itself. The fact that UNHCR is a substitute decision maker with
significant resource and capacity restraints128 does not justify a weaker application of
procedural standards by UNHCR. The need to respect the human rights principle of
non-refoulement creates an obligation for UNHCR to meet the same procedural
standards in RSD as States. It is argued that these standards are, at a minimum, that
RSD be fair, efficient and effective.
UNHCR’s RSD applies to what are known as ‘mandate refugees’. In contrast to RSD
conducted by States, a mandate refugee is determined by the definition of a refugee
outlined in UNHCR’s Statute,129 which is similar, but not identical to the Refugee
Convention’s definition of a refugee. A person who meets the criteria for a refugee in
UNHCR’s Statute will qualify for protection by UNHCR, regardless of whether he or
she is within the territory of a party to the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, or
whether he or she has been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention.130
UNHCR may also apply broader regional refugee definitions in Africa and Latin
America, 131 or as a result of an UNGA resolution in a given situation 132 or under
complementary protection criteria.
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In 2014, UNHCR was responsible, or jointly responsible for RSD in 68 countries and
received 245,600 new and appeal applications for asylum or refugee status.133 In the
same period UNHCR made 99,600 substantive decisions, which included convention
status decisions, complementary protection and rejections.134
For RSD to be consistent with the principles of international protection, one of its
primary objectives must be respect for non-refoulement.135 Non-refoulement is both
central to the concept of international protection and a human right. Non-refoulement
was included in the Refugee Convention by article 33(1), which was based upon
previous State practice and international agreements 136 and created a binding State
obligation not to refoule refugees unless one of the national security or crime
exception circumstances in article 33(2) applies. The application of non-refoulement
has been given wider application by its inclusion in various instruments of
international and human rights law 137 and is widely accepted to have gained the
requisite character of customary international law.138 It has also been suggested that
non-refoulement has evolved beyond customary international law and treaty law to
achieve the status of jus cogens. 139
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States and UNHCR are bound to respect non-refoulement as the cornerstone of
international protection and as RSD is the practical means, or the ‘entry point’140
through which a person becomes entitled to protection, it follows that procedurally
sufficient RSD is a vital defence against the risk of refoulement. 141 UNHCR
acknowledges this when it states that, ‘respect for the principle of non-refoulement
can therefore be most effectively ensured if claims to refugee status and asylum are
determined substantively and expeditiously.’ 142 If RSD outcomes are substantively
accurate, the risk of non-refoulement is significantly diminished.143 The likelihood of
substantive accuracy of RSD is lessened if procedural standards are not in place to
provide a system of checks and balances on the decision-making process. 144
Procedural standards encourage more stringent justification for findings on facts and
lessen the likelihood of bias in the decision-making process. Most importantly, they
provide an effective remedy in the form of review.
For States, RSD procedural standards are shaped by domestic accountability
mechanisms provided for by administrative law, such as regulation and administrative
tribunals, as well as domestic and international judicial opinion, UNHCR’s policy
guides and handbooks and the Conclusions of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme (‘ExCom’). States are responsible to ensure that their

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190-93 (1984-85) section III(5); J Allain, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature
of Non-refoulement’ (2001) 13 IJRL 534, 538. Cf. W A. Schabas, ‘Non-Refoulement’, Background
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protection —a general principle of law—the RSD obligation is created: an obligation to conduct
refugee status determination in a manner which provides effective legal protection against
the possibility of refoulement or denial of rights due under the refugee convention.’
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RSD procedures are ‘fair and efficient or expeditious’145 or ‘fair and effective’.146 In a
report on fair and efficient asylum processes, UNHCR stated that:
Fair and efficient procedures are an essential element in the full and inclusive
application of the Convention. They enable a State to identify those who should
benefit from international protection under the Convention, and those who should
not.147

The ExCom has also acknowledged the link between international protection and the
need for ‘fair and efficient’ procedures by emphasising:
[T]he importance of establishing and ensuring access … to fair and efficient
procedures for the determination of refugee status in order to ensure that refugees and
other persons eligible for protection under international or national law are identified
and granted protection.148

The ExCom has also recognised a link between non-refoulement and ‘fair and
effective’ procedures. The ExCom:
Strongly deplores the continuing incidence and often tragic humanitarian
consequences of refoulement in all its forms, including through summary removals,
occasionally en masse, and reiterates in this regard the need to admit refugees to the
territory of States, which includes no rejection at frontiers without access to fair and
effective procedures for determining their status and protection needs.149

It is argued that by virtue of relevant instruments, case law, UNGA resolutions and
UNHCR/ExCom policy, there is a minimum requirement for RSD to be fair, efficient
and effective, which is linked to non-refoulement in such a way as to be inextricable
from it.150 Each of these elements will be considered in turn.
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If RSD procedures are not effective they are not achieving their purpose. RSD
procedures are created to carry out the legal obligation to not refoule an individual
and it follows that to not be effective in this context is to commit a legal error. If a
State commits a legal error by failing to recognise the refugee status of an individual
who should be recognised otherwise, it has failed to protect a refugee by exposing
them to refoulement.151
Erika Feller, UNHCR’s then Assistant High Commissioner of Protection, has claimed
that the core elements for an effective RSD system include
(i) a single, specialized first instance body with qualified decision-makers,
trained and supported with country of origin information;
(ii) adequate resources to ensure efficiency, to identify those in need of
protection quickly and to curb abuse;
(iii) an appeal to an authority different from and independent of that making
the initial decision; and
(iv) a single process to deal with both refugee status and complementary forms
of protection. 152
What ‘effective’ means in the context of refugee-related decisions has been
considered by the ECtHR in regards to the requirements for an ‘effective remedy’, as
stipulated by article 13 of the ECHR. 153 In Chahal v United Kingdom, a case where
the applicant, who was a Sikh, was facing deportation from the UK to India for
national security reasons, the ECtHR found that an effective remedy requires
‘independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a
real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3…’ 154 UNHCR has also stated that an
effective remedy is a ‘second instance’ appeal where law and fact are considered (i.e.
responsibilities derived from the Convention, international and regional human rights instruments, as
well as relevant ExCom conclusions.’ Fair and Efficient (n 137). Whilst it is agreed that these are
relevant, the focus here is on non-refoulement.
151
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judicial review).155 Considering UNHCR and judicial opinion together, effectiveness
in RSD can be perceived as the resources, expertise and availability of first instance
decision making and independent review to ensure legally correct determinations.
The term efficiency is not given a general meaning in UNHCR or ExCom
documentation, but is often used interchangeably or in conjunction with the need for
expeditious decision making. 156 Expeditious decision making, or the right to RSD
‘without unreasonable delay’ has been argued to be an element of due process that is
sourced from articles 6-11 of the UDHR and articles 13-14 of the ICCPR. 157
Considering Erika Feller has stated that ‘adequate resources to ensure efficiency’ is
part of an effective RSD system,158 efficiency within the RSD context can be taken to
mean the efficient allocation and use of resources, as well as the expectation that RSD
procedures are performed expeditiously.
Fairness is an elusive concept because it is both contextual and multi-faceted. Rather
than being understood as encompassing ideals of democracy or good governance,
fairness within the context of administrative decision making takes on a narrower
‘procedural-type’ meaning to stand for concepts of procedural fairness, natural justice
or due process.159
The most fundamental element of fairness is an impartial and independent hearing,
which is required by article 14(1) of the ICCPR. In A v Australia, the Australian
government challenged an argument that RSD could be subject to article 14(1) by
arguing that proceedings relating to refugee status do not deal with civil rights or
obligations and that the decision to allow entry into its territory is a matter for the
State concerned. Whilst not making a finding that RSD is always subject to the
procedural standards set out in article 14(1), the HRC left the matter open by finding
that:
155
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The issue whether the proceedings … fall within the scope of article 14, paragraph 1,
is a question which should be considered on its merits.160

UNHCR and ExCom have also identified161 an impartial or independent review as
being integral to a fair RSD system.162 Other elements of procedurally fair RSD that
they identified are access to information,163 access to an interpreter,164 an opportunity
to adequately present a case165 and a reasonable time to lodge an appeal. 166
UNHCR, like States, must ensure that its RSD practices are fair, efficient and
effective in order to be compliant with its non-refoulement obligations. UNHCR is
bound to respect non-refoulement as customary international law, and because it is a
subsidiary organ of the UN. Like States, when UNHCR conducts RSD it is obligated
to respect non-refoulement, and like States, this requires the adoption of procedural
standards that are fair, effective and efficient in accordance with relevant instruments,
case law, UNGA resolutions, UNHCR policy 167 and ExCom Conclusions. 168 In
UNHCR's own words ‘The main elements [of due process applicable to governments]
160
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must also apply to UNHCR if we are to ensure fair and proper examination of
applications’.169

IV CONCLUSION
States have both the ultimate responsibility for international protection and the ability
to prevent UNHCR from achieving its own mandate by refusing access to refugees in
its territory. Ideally, UNHCR’s role in camp administration and RSD would be
decreased through greater State responsibility and burden sharing via increased
funding and raised quotas for refugee intake. A State-backed and funded mechanism
for review of UNHCR RSD is urgently needed. An independent and impartial review
mechanism, whatever its form, will provide asylum seekers with an effective remedy
that will enable an independent arbiter to decide whether the procedural standards of
‘fairness, efficiency and effectiveness’ are being met, and fundamentally, guard
against non-refoulement.
However, as long as UNHCR engages in camp administration and RSD, it is
imperative that it retains limited human rights obligations that exist alongside of, and
not in substitution for, those of States. The difficulty with this proposition, however,
is the lack of remedies available for individuals who seek to hold IO's, including
UNHCR, accountable for human rights abuse. If a breach of UNHCR’s human rights
obligations could be classified as an ‘internationally wrongful act’, Part III of ARIO,
which sets out the content of international responsibility of IOs, limits its scope to
States, other IOs or to the ‘international community as a whole’.170 Part IV excludes
individuals from invoking responsibility against an IO. 171 Although article 33(1) is
without prejudice to individuals who wish to challenge responsibility in an alternative
forum such as a domestic court, 172 the ability to do so is limited by the doctrine of IO
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immunities. 173 The difficulty of seeking redress for human rights abuse does not,
however, remove the capacity to hold human rights obligations in the first place.

Although UNHCR’s primary role remains international protection facilitated through
State collaboration, its direct interaction with vulnerable individuals renders any
suggestion that UNHCR has no obligation to protect their human rights as untenable.
When UNHCR’s implied powers are considered with its capacity to hold human
rights obligations, which comes from its position as a subsidiary organ of the UN and
from general principles of international law, accountability is created for UNHCR to
protect the human rights of refugees in certain circumstances. In particular, UNHCR's
implied powers of administering refugee camps creates an obligation to respect,
protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees who reside within those camps. Finally,
UNHCR's implied power to conduct RSD creates an obligation for it to ensure that its
RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective as a means of acting as a bulwark
against non-refoulement.
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In the recent case of Georges et al v United Nations, heard in the New York District Court, a group
of Haitian residents lodged a class action against the UN for liability for the 2010 cholera outbreak that
killed thousands and injured many more. Although the UN denied culpability for the outbreak, it is
commonly accepted that the cause was inadequate sanitation in a camp used by Nepalese peacekeepers.
The court found that as UN refused to expressly waive its immunity, it was immune from suit. Any
alleged inadequacy of the UN's failure to offer an alternative mode of settlement, such as settling the
private law claim or establishing a Standing Claims Commission, did not undermine the requirement
for express waiver.
Georges et al suggests a shy potential for a reinterpretation of section 29(a) of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (‘Convention on Immunities’) (1 UNTS 15. Applies to
UNHCR as a subsidiary organ), which states that ‘[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for
appropriate modes of settlement of … disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private
law character to which the United Nations is a party.’ The court acknowledged that the word shall ‘is
more than merely aspirational’ and that ‘it is obligatory and perhaps enforceable.’ Although the court
found that section 29 could not override the clear and specific grant of immunity in section 2, it may be
that a court willing to take a more teleological approach would render an interpretation of section 29 a
necessary precondition to the grant of immunity, in accordance with the object and purpose (Vienna
Convention (n 10) art 31(1)) of the Convention on Immunities, which was, after all, to ensure
independence of the UN from its members (D Sarooshi, ‘The Powers of the United Nations Criminal
Tribunals’ in J. A. Frowein and R Wolfru (eds) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 2
(Kluwer Law International 1998) 141, 191) and not immunity from the suit of individuals.
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